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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JANICE ROUNDS and DYLAN ROUNDS, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
-v-
THE STATE OF UTAH , and UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS - APPELLEES 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The instant action comes within the original jurisdiction of 
the Supreme Court of Utah under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j) 
(Supp. 1993). Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (Supp. 
1993), and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k) (Supp. 1993), this 
Court has jurisdiction over this appeal by reason of the transfer 
of this action from the Supreme Court of Utah to the Utah Court 
of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. The judgment of the trial court was not invalidated by 
the alleged failure of the defendants to file a notice of signing 
or entry of judgment. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The district court judge is vested with 
considerable discretion under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure ,in deciding whether to grant or deny a motion to 
set aside a judgment. Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 
1986) . A denial of such a motion should be reversed only for an 
Case No. 930460-CA 
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abuse of discretion. State, Dep't of Social Serv. v. Viiil, 784 
P.2d 1130, 1132 (Utah 1989). 
2. Plaintiffs have not been prejudiced by the alleged 
failure of the defendants to file a notice of signing or entry of 
judgment. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This standard of review is the same as 
for the first issue, supra. 
3. Plaintiffs' motion to set aside the judgment, coming 
under Rule 60(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, was 
untimely. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The trial court's determination as to 
which clause of Rule 60(b) is applicable, is either reviewed 
under abuse of discretion (Gardiner and Gardiner Builders v. 
Swapp, 656 P.2d 429, 430 (Utah 1982)) or is reviewed for 
correctness (Lincoln Beneficial Life v. D.T. S. Properties, 83 8 
P.2d 672, 674 (Utah App. 1992)). 
4. Even if plaintiffs' motion to set aside the judgment, 
was considered as coming under Rule 60(b)(7) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, it was untimely. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This standard of review is the same as 
for the first issue, supra. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Rule 58A(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(1993) 
Notice of signing or entry of judgment. The 
prevailing party shall promptly give notice 
of the signing or entry of judgment to all 
other parties and shall file proof of service 
of such notice with the clerk of the court. 
2 
However, the time for filing a notice of 
appeal is not affected by the notice 
requirement of this provision. 
Rule 60, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1993) 
(This Rule is set forth verbatim in the 
addendum to this brief) 
Rule 4-504, Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration (1993) 
(This Rule is set forth verbatim in the 
addendum to this brief) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs brought the instant action against the State of 
Utah and its Department of Transportation. R. 2-5. Defendants 
filed two motions to compel discovery (R. 21-35, 77-101) and a 
motion to dismiss (R. 102-7). Plaintiffs, rather than respond to 
the motion to dismiss and the second motion to compel discovery, 
proposed to defendants that the parties stipulate to the 
dismissal of this action without prejudice. R. 140. Defendants 
trial counsel prepared a stipulation and order of dismissal and 
sent the same to plaintiffs' counsel. R. 140, 144-45. 
Plaintiffs' counsel declined to sign the stipulation as prepared, 
and instead prepared a new stipulation and order of dismissal 
that he signed and sent to defendants counsel.1 R. 140, 148-49. 
Plaintiffs' proposed stipulation and order were acceptable to the 
defendants counsel, who signed the same and submitted it to the 
court pursuant to the plaintiffs' attorneys instructions. R. 
1
 While prepared by the plaintiffs' attorney, this second 
proposed stipulation and order has the defendants' counsels name 
in its heading. 
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167. Defendants counsel asked his secretary to send a copy of 
the stipulation and order to plaintiffs' attorney, and the 
original to the court. R. 167. 
The trial court signed the order of dismissal on September 
16, 1991. R. 118-19. No notice of signing or entry of judgment 
appears in the record. On January 15, 1993, some sixteen months 
after the entry of the order of dismissal in this action, 
plaintiffs filed their motion for relief from judgment. R. 120-
37. The trial court denied this motion on March 9, 1993. R. 
183-84. The plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal on April 5, 
1993. R. 185-87. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On June 20 and 21, 1991 respectively, defendants counsel 
filed two motions: a motion to compel plaintiffs to provide 
sufficient answers to interrogatories that had been served on 
August 20, 1990; and a motion to dismiss without prejudice 
because plaintiffs failed to file the undertaking required by 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-19 (1989). R. 77-107. Plaintiffs did not 
respond to these motions, so on July 15, 1991 the motions were 
submitted for decision. R. 108-9. 
On July 23, 1991, counsel for the parties stipulated, and 
the court so ordered, that plaintiffs be allowed until August 15, 
1991 to respond to these motions. R. 110-13. Sometime after 
August 15, 1991, but before September 3, 1991, plaintiffs' 
counsel called defendants' attorney, informing him that 
plaintiffs would stipulate to dismiss this action without 
4 
prejudice if defendants would withdraw their motion to compel. 
R. 140, 167. Defendants' counsel agreed, prepared a stipulation 
and order and had it delivered to plaintiffs' counsel on 
September 3, 1991 for approval. R. 140, 144-47, 167. 
On September 4, 1991, plaintiffs' counsel mailed to the 
defendants' attorney a court document entitled "Stipulation and 
Order of Dismissal Without Prejudice." The State of Utah's 
counsel reviewed it and signed it on September 6, 1991. R. 14 0, 
148-49, 167. This agreed to stipulation and order was signed by 
the trial court on September 16, 1991. R. 118-19. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs' attorney proposed to defendants' counsel that 
this action be dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff's counsel 
drafted the proposed stipulation, signed it, and sent it to the 
defendants' counsel for signature and to be presented to the 
court. This was done, and the trial court dismissed the action 
without prejudice pursuant to the stipulation of the parties. 
Sixteen months later plaintiffs' attorneys sought to have the 
judgment set aside on the sole basis that the defendants' 
attorney did not send the plaintiffs' counsel a notice of the 
entry or signing of the order prepared by plaintiffs' attorney. 
While required by both the Rules of Civil Procedure and the 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration, the failure of a party to 
file a notice of signing or entry of judgment does not invalidate 
the judgment of the trial court. Without more, plaintiffs cannot 
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prove they were prejudiced by the trial court's signing and 
filing of the order prepared by the plaintiffs' attorney. 
Plaintiffs claims fall under Rule 60(b)(1) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Therefore, plaintiffs' motion was untimely 
because it was filed well after the three month time limitation 
established by the rule. Even if the plaintiffs motion fell 
within subsection seven of the rule, the failure to learn that 
the order that they had prepared and approved had been signed for 
fourteen months was not reasonable. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE CORRECT STANDARD OF REVIEW IN THE 
INSTANT ACTION IS WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT 
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
Plaintiffs have set out, as the standard of review in this 
action, a correction of error standard. Brief of Appellants at 
1. This is incorrect. This is not an appeal from the dismissal 
of the instant action.2 Instead, this action concerns the trial 
court's denial of a motion to set aside judgment that was filed 
some sixteen months after the entry of that judgment. The 
relevant standard of review is one of abuse of discretion. 
The district court judge is vested with 
considerable discretion under Rule 60(b) in 
granting or denying a motion to set aside a 
judgment. . . . But, before we will 
interfere with the trial court's exercise of 
discretion, abuse of that discretion must be 
clearly shown. That some basis may exist to 
set aside the default does not require the 
conclusion that the court abused its 
2
 No such appeal was taken for the obvious fact that the 
parties stipulated to dismissing this action. 
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discretion in refusing to do so when facts 
and circumstances support the refusal. 
Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986) (citation omitted). 
Review in this action is not to "correct error." Rather, it is 
this Court's duty to determine whether plaintiffs have clearly 
shown that the trial court abused its discretion. If plaintiffs 
cannot meet this higher standard, then the order of the trial 
court should be affirmed. One of the exceptions to this 
deferential abuse of discretion standard is where the grounds for 
the motion to set aside the judgment are claims that the trial 
court lacked jurisdiction to enter the challenged order in the 
first place. Van Per Stappen v. Van Per Stappen, 815 P.2d 1335, 
1337 (Utah App. 1991) ; State, Pep't of Social Serv. v. Viiil, 784 
P.2d 1130, 1132 (Utah 1989). 
Plaintiffs have not alleged that the trial court was without 
jurisdiction in this action. No jurisdictional claim has ever 
been raised by the plaintiffs. Rather, the plaintiffs' only 
claim is that the otherwise valid judgment should have been set 
aside because plaintiffs did not receive notice of its entry. 
The limited exception concerning jurisdictional questions is 
inapplicable to the instant action. 
The other possible exception to this rule is where the trial 
court makes a determination as to which clause of Rule 60(b) is 
applicable. This court has stated that it accords no particular 
deference to such a conclusion of law, but reviews it for 
correctness. Lincoln Beneficial Life v. P.T. S. Properties, 838 
7 
P.2d 672, 674 (Utah App. 1992).3 While this standard applies to 
the issue of whether the plaintiffs' motion was properly 
considered as arising from Rule 60(b)(1) or Rule 60(b)(7), it is 
not applicable to the other issues presented by this appeal. 
Plaintiffs err in looking to the possible reasons behind the 
trial courts decision in their effort to avoid the abuse of 
discretion standard. If plaintiffs were correct, the general 
standard of review for denials of motions to set aside a judgment 
would never be used. The specific legal question of the 
sufficiency of the facts of each case would be cited to show that 
a correction of error standard should be used, and the trial 
court would not be accorded its proper discretion in deciding 
such motions. 
The correct standard of review in this matter, contrary to 
what is set out in the Brief of Appellants, is the deferential 
abuse of discretion standard with only the one exception noted 
above. 
II. FAILURE OF THE DEFENDANTS TO FILE A 
NOTICE OF SIGNING OR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT 
NEITHER INVALIDATED THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
NOR PREJUDICED THE PLAINTIFFS 
The only defect that plaintiffs claim existed in the order 
of dismissal entered by the trial court in this action is that 
defendants did not file a notice of signing or entry of judgment 
with the court and the plaintiffs concerning a stipulated 
3
 But it should be noted that the Supreme Court of Utah 
used the abuse of discretion standard in a similar setting in 
Gardiner and Gardiner Builders v. Swapp, 656 P. 2d 429, 430 (Utah 
1982) . 
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dismissal tha*- had b<^r. drafted K,r 4"^ ^ r*!--' -*-•!"r nrd appioved as 
Br 
.,...1., Instead, , lan.i , (is .*. * j ^ t; .r v v . . c urt abused 
IZF discretion, refusing * ---* '-^: *'•> - ' * ated dismissal on 
le a nr 
signing or entry of judgment somehow i nvalidates the underlying 
judgment. 
/ argument in Workman 
v. Naale Constr., Inc. •- . ;.-.-: ~<l- ra: A pp. 1 990'). 
Workman, the current pid-r.:. . :: .n this case, 
concedes that neither she nor the Division 
complied with Rule 58A(d) or Rule 4.5 [4] 
However, that noncompliance does not 
invalidate the judgment. Utah R.Civ.P. 
58A(c) provides that "[a] judgment is 
complete and shall be deemed entered for al 1 
purposes, except the creation of a lien on 
real property, when the same is signed and 
filed as hereinabove provided." Thus, in 
Mountain States Tel. & Tel, v. Sohm, 755 P.2d 
155, 157 (Utah 1988), the failure to give 
notice of the judgment did not preclude the 
effectiveness of the judgment, but rather, 
under the circumstances, was harmless error. 
Notice to the parties of the entry of the 
judgment was therefore not a prerequisite to 
its effectiveness. 
Id, at 751 (footnote omitted). See also Lincoln Beneficial Life 
v, ID ,T. M. Properties,, fnR IP" ?f\ r,7?( P r. (Ill ah Ap(i ) 
(failure* to give notice does not invalidate the underlying 
judgment Both Workman and Lincoln rejected the argument made 
jired notice 
- A precursor tn I h i i - m ill i PI ,|i ,i(| Judicial 
Administration 
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invalidated the challenged judgment. This court has made it 
clear that, while such a failure to provide notice is an 
important factor in determining the timeliness of a post-judgment 
motion for which an exact time limit is not prescribed, it is not 
a reason in itself for setting aside the judgment. The appellant 
in Workman did not prevail on her claim that she had not received 
notice of the judgment against her, but rather on her claim that 
the judgment was void because of independent procedural defects 
in the handling of that class action. 
This same result has been reached in the federal courts. 
This conclusion is consistent with the case 
law under the comparable federal rule. Rule 
77(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
requires that the clerk of the court notify 
the parties of the entry of a judgment. 
Although in federal procedure it is thus the 
clerk, rather than the prevailing party, who 
bears the responsibility to give notice of 
the judgment, the purpose and intended effect 
of the Utah and the federal rules are the 
same, namely, notice that a judgment has been 
entered. Federal courts generally hold that 
the losing party's lack of the required 
notice does not preclude effectiveness of the 
j udgment. 
Workman. 802 P.2d at 751. In Tucker v. Commonwealth Land Title 
Ins. Co., 800 F.2d 1054, 1056 (11th Cir. 1986), the plaintiff 
never received a copy of the judgment, and did not learn of the 
judgment until after the time to file a notice of appeal had run. 
The trial court, pursuant to a Rule 60(b) motion, vacated its 
order and reentered it so as to permit the plaintiff to file an 
appeal. The appellate court dismissed the appeal, finding that 
the trial court had abused its discretion in granting such 
10 
i • *•• ] i e f . I T I S p i k a \ Village of Lombard, 111 , 7 6 3 F .2d 282, 286 
(7th Cir. 1985), the court explained that the federal courts had 
uniformly held that: Rule 60(h) relief was barred wherp titc sole 
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of the entry of the stipulated dismissal of this action that 
their attorney drafted. ?Vccording .nt-jff-N, I|P I pridai M. M iwi-rt1 
judgment L..*. suant to Rule 
4-^- ~ < r \. i- * Judicial Admii i stration -:.- Rule 58A 
i&
 ^" '.*
 v
 " counsel 
. - , .. - , . 3t ,3; r:«r judgment: was 
never fi.ed a: . therefore invalid, notwithstanding the 
cont-*-^* decisions c ipulation
 a n (j 
order question were prepareu efendants attorney, 
but by the plaintiffs counsel. It xaintiffs 
who proposed t h*- • il i i-imi.ss.,i 1 r »f n I i hmif prejucL ^ 
was the plaintiffs' who prepared stipulation :-i ,d crde: 
question and sent the same to the defendants' 
Given these faofcs( r1**fenrl.uil • t nl mil . . ;<-
plaintiffs with a noiice of entry of judgment. ~-:\* -"- ~-~-d 
such a duty, iL would appear to be the p l a i n t s 
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 With the apparent intent to refile the action, thereby 
avoiding the question of the long overdue discovery responses and 
the failure to file the requisite undertaking. 
Plaintiffs wrongly suggest that they have been unfairly 
prejudiced. It was plaintiffs who initially proposed a dismissal 
and had their attorney draft a stipulation and order to that 
effect. Their attorney signed the stipulation, approved it as to 
form, and sent it to defense counsel for his signature. Since 
the proposed stipulation was substantively identical to one that 
defendants had proposed earlier, it should have come as no 
surprise that the defendants agreed to it, signed it, and filed 
it with the court as requested by plaintiffs' attorney. 
Defendants' counsel then instructed his secretary to send an 
executed copy to plaintiffs' counsel, but he never received it. 
Nevertheless, instead of asking about the stipulation or 
attempting to prosecute the case, plaintiffs did nothing for the 
next fourteen months. It is unreasonable for plaintiffs to claim 
unfair prejudice on these facts. They certainly did not wait 
fourteen months expecting defendants' counsel to respond to the 
proposed stipulation. Rather, they simply failed to follow 
through on a matter they set in motion. The Rule 60(b) policy 
announced by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Binder 
Robinson & Co. v. U.S.S.C.C, 748 F.2d 1415, 1421 (10th Cir. 
1984) is equally applicable here: 
Keeping the suit alive merely because the plaintiff 
should not be penalized for the omissions of his own 
attorney would be visiting the sins of the plaintiff's 
lawyer upon the defendant. 
Id. at 1421 (emphasis in original) (quoting Link v. Wabash 
Railroad, 370 U.S. 626, 634 n.10 (1962)). Plaintiffs cannot show 
prejudice. Their proffered reason does not justify relief from 
12 
judgment because plaintiffs' counsel, having drafted the 
si "•' "• and ordPT <>f dismissal, fully intended i. I I be 
signed and entered. Plaintiffs have nevei identified how the 
order their att.:r:v. - drafted has p i " \ u • ^ rh-v F aint ^fs 
it 
was, after all, drafted by |.jd^.: ii:^ , -« ,. The.r rn,y ;] -•-• 
n*_ : f j.r - ' nificat m I'ha*" th^ o H e r ^^ey 
have failed . ; - , - reason for wr.-;*n the *_r,ai c-,. urr. 
could have grar^ -'-.i * ^ H n '**• i-^ i. The • » ^ n w o m u have 
abus e d 1 :i :i s ::i::i s ci e t i 01 i ::i c s' mot i on 
contrary to this court's decisions in Workman and Lincoln. 
III. PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
JUDGMENT WAS UNTIMELY 
Rule 60 (b^ *ii Kales ol Civil ': 
ner^ -i.Q "mistake, ..^j.e.Le.'.ct, 
surprise or exons-K •=- neg'lec: -not: en unde- ' - * ,JL# ,_) 
must ho brought • * * u three morr ' 
entered v»as express. - . v . .- ."-'?ing 
post-judgment motions begins 4 though notice 
judgment was not WeLL^Lkn ' so 
In Re Bundy's Estate, 241 P. '3 .. 
The plaintiffs' claim is best categorized as stating that 
t h r o u g h n e g l i g e n c > - .>rf e11ri* I 111 <> i i ,i il | n n i <\>-,, i II I >
 (m II i 11 
c the entry udgment that plaintiffs' attorneys had 
proposed drafted, and signed, - fourteen months after 
e prejudice 
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claimed by the plaintiffs appear to be that this negligence or 
inadvertence on the part of their attorneys precluded the 
plaintiffs from refiling their action within one year of its 
dismissal without prejudice. In Lincoln Beneficial Life this 
court held that a failure to act seasonably, through mistake or 
neglect, falls within Rule 60(b)(1). This court went on to hold 
that if subsection one applied, subsection seven (which does not 
have the same three month period of limitations) cannot be used. 
As the residuary clause of Rule 60(b), 
subsection (7) embodies three requirements 
for relief: "First, that the reason be one 
other than those listed in subdivisions (1) 
through (6); second, that the reason justify 
relief; and third, that the motion be made 
within a reasonable time." Subsection (7) 
"'should be very cautiously and sparingly 
invoked by the Court only in unusual and 
exceptional instances.'" Furthermore, 
subsection (7) may not be employed for relief 
when the grounds asserted are encompassed 
within subsection (1). Otherwise the three-
month time limitation for filing motions 
pursuant to subsection (1) would be 
circumvented. 
Lincoln Beneficial Life, 838 P.2d at 674-75 (emphasis in 
original) (citations omitted). See also Calder Bros. Co. v. 
Anderson. 652 P.2d 922, 926 (Utah 1982) (rule 60(b)(7) is not 
available to one who should have filed under rule 60(b)(1) but 
did not). This court's decision in Lincoln is of great 
significance because that action also contained a claim that a 
notice of entry of judgment had not been given. Because the 
instant action, like Lincoln, involves a failure to act 
seasonably, defendants submit that the present action also falls 
under subsection (1), and therefore the motion to set aside 
14 
•. See also R i c h m s v. Deisert Chipman & 
Sons Co. , • . . i -?2 ?"r F~ 'T'T .-.:: T\: \ —-l" is^eekinq j.-lief 
ire- a stipulati^^- entered --^^ *hrrv.o- mistake * . " '• n 
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1990) (seeking relief *• • . sr.ipulati *; entered :::t through 
mistake **-* ,^<v :^ ^ubsec-=-r "••'-- _^-.^ .„ . ...JL -^-a:. Tel. 
Ass' i *..*•.:: a : veasonably 
falls under subsection onf ' 
•'*"erpret,v * Lhe re" . 
« • n*c& -torney neglect fall withi n the 
identical Fee - /-:;• ^  .:- " * *- federal 
version of ULcui K. LIV. L IT, 
Federal Practice & Procedure § 2864 _ , - ) . 
In the present case, plaintiffs received tardy notice of the 
dismiss?- i ' counsel 
draite- ~>^ .^ , ,. .. :*. .. .-,.•.< . ;-.;;:. :•• • tismissal : approved the 
order a; f- :e sei-* defense counsel * , 
lr'inl signea .-atered. When 
he did not. he^ - defense counse: i "aintiffs ::torney made 
no inquiry. ••:-- •: - othing ^ for tr:~ 
m o i i I lii!1'!' in in, I ;ii I inquiry plaintiffs he 
investigated and discovered that the order of dismissal had been 
The equivalent provision of the federal rules is Rule 
60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This is 
because there is no federal counterpart to Rule 60(b) (4) ' l 'e 
Utah Rules of Ci vil Procedure, 
entered on September 16, 1991. This is neglect, if anything, and 
falls within Rule 60(b)(1). 
Plaintiffs rely on the Supreme Court of Utah's decision in 
Bigelow v. Ingersoll, 618 P.2d 50 (Utah 1980) for a unique claim 
that their time in which to file their motion to set aside the 
judgment in this matter was somehow stayed. Plaintiffs' reliance 
on Bigelow is misplaced. Rule 58A of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure was expressly amended so as to effectively overrule the 
holding in Bigelow. Workman, 802 P.2d at 751 n.4. In both 
Workman and Lincoln this court has expressly ruled that no such 
stay exists under the current rule. Indeed, Bigelow involved a 
notice of appeal and not a post-trial motion. Workman clearly 
held that the Bigelow line of cases, since overruled by the 
amendment of the Rules of Civil Procedure, never applied to post-
trial motions. 
Even if this court were to hold that the instant motion was 
properly brought under Rule 60(b)(7), the plaintiffs motion was 
still untimely. The motion was not brought in a reasonable 
amount of time. It was unreasonable for the plaintiffs to take 
sixteen months to file a motion to set aside a judgment that the 
plaintiffs had requested and drafted. There can be no claim of 
prejudice when plaintiffs did nothing for over fourteen months to 
attempt to prosecute the case or inquire as to the status of the 
order their attorney drafted. Plaintiffs' sixteen month delay in 
bringing the motion for relief is therefore not reasonable. 
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BRADLEY HELSTEN 
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ADDENDUM "A" 
JAN GRAHAM - 1231 
Attorney General 
REED M. STRINGHAM - 4679 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for State of Utah 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 575-1650 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JANICE ROUNDS and DYLAN 
ROUNDS, : ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 
: RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT 
Plaintiffs, : 
v. : 
: Civil No. 900902566PI 
STATE OF UTAH, and UTAH : 
DEPARTMENT OF : Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
TRANSPORTATION, : 
Defendants. : 
Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment or 
Order. The parties filed supporting and opposing memoranda and 
affidavits and the motion was submitted for decision on February 
19, 1993. The Court denied the motion for the reasons stated in 
its February 22, 1993 Minute Entry. 
Ti... 
K:.3 9 1393 
SALT* A ™ 
000183 
9j^-day of February, 1993. 
IT IS ORDERED that plaintiffs' Motion for Relief from 
Judgment is denied. 
DATED this _ ^ 
BY THE COURT: 
<L. 
DENNIS FREDERICK 
rt Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT, 
this ^ Jy day of February, 1993, to the following: 
Robert F. Orton 
Milo S. Marsden 
MARSDEN, ORTON, CAHOON & GOTTFREDSON 
68 SOUTH MAIN STREET 
FIFTH FLOOR 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
//&&€»> / 
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ADDENDUM "B" 
RULE 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders 
or other parts of the record and errors therein arising from 
oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any 
time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and 
after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the 
pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected 
before the appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and 
thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected 
with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly 
discovered evidence; fraud# etc. On motion and upon such 
terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice 
relieve a party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) 
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) 
newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not 
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under 
Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated 
intrinsic or extrinsic) , misrepresentation or other misconduct 
of an adverse party; (4) when, for any cause, the summons in 
an action has not been personally served upon the defendant as 
required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear 
in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has 
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment 
upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, 
or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have 
prospective application; or (7) any other reason justifying 
relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall 
be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2) , 
(3) , or (4) , not more than 3 motions after the judgment, 
order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under 
this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a 
judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit 
the power of a court to entertain an independent action to 
relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set 
aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for 
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as 
prescribed in these rules or by an independent action. 
ADDENDUM "C" 
RULE 4-504. Written orders# judgments and decrees 
Intent: To establish a uniform procedure for submitting written 
orders, judgments, and decrees to the court. This rule is not 
intended to change existing law with respect to the enforceability 
of unwritten agreements. 
Applicability: This rule shall apply to all civil proceedings in 
courts of record except small claims. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) In all rulings by a court, counsel for the party or 
parties obtaining the ruling shall within fifteen days, or within 
a shorter time as the court may direct, file with the court a 
proposed order, judgment, or decree in conformity with the ruling. 
(2) Copies of the proposed findings, judgments, and orders 
shall be served upon opposing counsel before being presented to the 
court for signature unless the court otherwise orders. Notice of 
objections shall be submitted to the court and counsel within five 
days after service. 
(3) Stipulated settlements and dismissals shall also be 
reduced to writing and presented to the court for signature within 
fifteen days of the settlement and dismissal. 
(4) Upon entry of judgment, notice of such judgment shall be 
served upon the opposing party and proof of such service shall be 
filed with the court. All judgments, orders, and decrees, or 
copies thereof, which are to be transmitted after signature by the 
judge, including other correspondence requiring a reply, must be 
accompanied by pre-addressed envelopes and pre-paid postage. 
(5) All orders, judgments, and decrees shall be prepared in 
such a manner as to show whether they are entered upon the 
stipulation of counsel, the motion of counsel or upon the court's 
own initiative and shall identify the attorneys of record in the 
cause or proceeding in which the judgment, order or decree is made. 
(6) Except where otherwise ordered, all judgments and decrees 
shall contain the address or the last known address of the judgment 
debtor and the social security number of the judgment debtor if 
known. 
(7) All judgments and decrees shall be prepared as separate 
documents and shall not include any matters by reference unless 
otherwise directed by the court. Orders not constituting judgments 
or decrees may be made a part of the documents containing the 
stipulation or motion upon which the order is based. 
(8) No orders, judgments, or decrees based upon stipulation 
shall be signed or entered unless the stipulation is in writing, 
signed by the attorneys of record for the respective parties and 
filed with the clerk or the stipulation was made on the record. 
(9) In all cases where judgment is rendered upon a written 
obligation to pay money and a judgment has previously been rendered 
upon the same written obligation, the plaintiff or plaintiff's 
counsel shall attach to the new complaint a copy of all previous 
judgments based upon the same written obligation. 
(10) Nothing in this rule shall be construed to limit the 
power of any court, upon a proper showing, to enforce a settlement 
agreement or any other agreement which has not been reduced to 
writing. 
